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"Don't Try This at Home":
Posner as Political Economist
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz t
On September 8, 1986, the Chicago City Council enacted a com-
prehensive ordinance regulating the relationship between landlords
and tenants, following seven years of heated deliberation.' The Chi-
cago Board of Realtors, along with property owners and managers,
challenged the ordinance's constitutionality in federal court the fol-
lowing month.
The plaintiffs in Chicago Board of Realtors v City of Chicago3 ob-
jected to more than a dozen provisions in the ordinance, the most per-
tinent of which: (1) enabled tenants to withhold rent or make repairs
themselves if their landlord ignored demands to make necessary re-
pairs; (2) authorized tenants to secure substitute housing without pen-
alty if the landlord failed to maintain "habitable" premises; (3) capped
penalties for late rent payments; and (4) required that tenant security
deposits be held in separate, instate, interest-bearing accounts.4 The
plaintiffs argued that these provisions violated their rights under the
federal Constitution's Due Process, Contracts, dormant Commerce,
and Takings Clauses.' The district court rejected all these claims, not-
ing that while some of the ordinance's provisions seemed in tension
with the text of the Constitution, prior precedents foreclosed the pos-
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. The author thanks Jake Gersen, Doug
Lichtman, and Stephanie Stern for comments and Emily McKinney for fine research assistance.
I Chicago Board of Realtors v City of Chicago, 673 F Supp 224,226 (ND 111 1986).
2 Chicago Board of Realtors, Inc v City of Chicago, 819 F2d 732,734 (7th Cir 1987).
3 673 F Supp 224 (ND I11 1986), affirmed 819 F2d 732 (7th Cir 1987).
4 Id at 230, 233, 236. The plaintiffs also challenged provisions: (1) providing that landlords
give tenants two days' notice before accessing the apartment for nonemergencies; (2) requiring
that tenants be given detailed receipts upon making payments to landlords; (3) imposing joint
and several liability on successor landlords for interest and security deposits; (4) requiring land-
lords to provide to prospective tenants an itemization of any code violation citations issued by
the city in the previous twelve months, pending code enforcement litigation, and any notice of
intent by a utility to terminate service to the building; (5) prohibiting landlords from withholding
consent to reasonable subleases; (6) requiring landlords to attach a summary of the ordinance to
all new or renewed residential leases; (7) creating a rebuttable presumption of retaliatory evic-
tion in instances where a landlord cancelled or failed to renew a lease with a tenant who had
exercised his rights under the ordinance; (8) requiring that landlords disclose to tenants the
identity of the actual owners of properties held or managed in trust; and (9) rendering unen-
forceable lease provisions that would conflict with the ordinance's framework. Id at 229-30.
5 Id at 229-36.
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sibility of its unconstitutionality.6 The law withstood rational basis
scrutiny, though the district court went on the record with doubts as to
whether the law represented enlightened public policy. 7 As it came to
the Seventh Circuit, therefore, this comprehensive ordinance had been
judged unwise, but not unconstitutional.
The Seventh Circuit granted an expedited appeal schedule but re-
fused to enjoin the ordinance pending appeal.8 Judge Cudahy wrote a
dry majority opinion affirming the trial court. Cudahy's opinion
largely parroted the district court's handiwork, relying heavily on Su-
preme Court opinions that foreclosed the plaintiffs' Contracts Clause
and substantive due process claims.'
Had the matter ended there, Chicago Board of Realtors would
have been an unremarkable and uninteresting case, one of a string of
judicial opinions rejecting constitutional attacks on landlord-tenant
regulations." But the matter did not end there. Judge Posner, writing
for himself and Judge Easterbrook, noted his agreement with
Cudahy's opinion "as far as it goes," but bemoaned its failure to "go
far enough."" In Posner's view, Cudahy's straightforward application
of Supreme Court precedents to the plaintiffs' claims "makes the re-
jection of the appeal seem easier than it is, by refusing to acknowledge
the strong case that can be made for the unreasonableness of the or-
dinance."'2 Hence, Posner was "led to write separately, and since this
separate opinion commands the support of two members of this panel,
it is also a majority opinion.""
In the paragraphs that followed, Posner chastised the city council
(for enacting such a misguided and disingenuous law), the Supreme
Court (for foreclosing what should have been meritorious claims un-
der the Due Process and Contracts Clauses), and the appellants' law-
yers (for inexplicably waiving on appeal their purportedly most prom-
ising arguments, having to do with the Takings and dormant Com-
merce Clauses'). Judge Cudahy was plainly annoyed, dismissively re-
6 Id at 238.
7 Id at 237 (confiding that "[i]f it were my job to evaluate the wisdom of the Ordinance I
would grade it highly questionable if not substantially inadvisable").
8 Chicago Board of Realtors, 819 F2d at 734.
9 Id at 734-41.
10 See 40 ALR 3d 821 at § 2 (1971) (summarizing the general failure of constitutional
challenges to rent withholding statutes).
11 Chicago Board of Realtors, 819 F2d at 741 (Posner concurring).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Appellants' counsel did not deserve Posner's criticism. Having raised a plethora of griev-
ances below, counsel sensibly became more selective on appeal, developing the strongest argu-
ments and jettisoning the rest. The appellants thus waived their Takings Clause argument (a
likely loser, as the district court correctly held, for the reasons noted in note 58) and their dor-
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ferring to Posner's concurring opinion as, "at best, superfluous."'
Cudahy was of course right in one sense; Posner's opinion consisted
entirely of dicta. But Posner's opinion was far from superfluous in an-
other important sense. It analyzed in some depth the economics of
landlord-tenant regulation so as to generate a novel, intellectually
audacious, and falsifiable hypothesis about the political factors driving
the ordinance's enactment. Posner's analysis of these sorts of regula-
tions has been influential in the academy, and this Essay evaluates the
merits of his approach.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF LANDLORD-TENANT REGULATION
The central premise of Posner's economic argument is that by
making the landlord business less profitable, the Chicago ordinance
would induce building owners to convert rental buildings into condo-
miniums, to the detriment of poor renters. 6 This is a testable claim, but
the available evidence is not terribly supportive. The leading study on
condominium conversions, which was published shortly after Posner's
opinion, suggests that demand-side factors (buyers wanting to pur-
chase homes) were approximately twice as important as supply-side
factors (landlords finding rental buildings insufficiently profitable) in
driving condominium conversion rates."
Of course, that study still suggests that supply-side factors play a
role in condominium conversions. A more satisfying way of testing
Posner's economic thesis would be to study what happened in the
many jurisdictions that enacted legislation similar to Chicago's. The
most relevant empirical study available when Posner penned his opin-
ion suggested that the sorts of interventions employed by Chicago,
such as rent withholding for warranty violations, repair-and-deduct
remedies for tenants whose landlords refuse to make repairs, and pro-
tections against retaliatory evictions, have no statistically significant
effects on tenant welfare, as determined using a hedonic price model. 8
Posner's opinion cited this study, by Werner Hirsch, though he did not
mant Commerce Clause argument (a stronger argument, but one that would have, at most, in-
validated a trifling detail in the ordinance-the requirement that deposits be held in Illinois
banks). Despite this, Posner criticized the plaintiffs for not having "raised on this appeal their
most promising challenges" for "reasons that are obscure." Id at 745.
15 Id at 737 n 2 (majority).
16 Id at 741 (Posner concurring).
17 See Theodore M. Crone, Changing Rates of Return on Rental Property and Condomin-
ium Conversions, 25 Urban Stud 34, 38-39 (1988).
18 See Werner Z. Hirsch, Habitability Laws and the Welfare of Indigent Tenants, 63 Rev
Econ & Stat 263,271,274 (1981). See also Werner Z. Hirsch and Cheung-Kwok Law, Habitability
Laws and the Shrinkage of Substandard Rental Housing Stock, 16 Urban Stud 19,27 (1979) (con-
cluding that "in no case do repair and deduct laws have a statistically significant effect on the
shrinkage of substandard rental housing").
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describe its empirical findings. 9 Hirsch, though a skeptic of these laws,
found that only the enactment of draconian receivership laws was
demonstrably counterproductive from a tenant welfare perspective,'
and Chicago's ordinance contained no receivership provisions. In sub-
sequent work, Hirsch recrunched his numbers to show that habitabil-
ity mandates were associated with statistically significant reductions in
the welfare of black indigent tenants but did not affect the welfare of
aged indigent tenants." No economists, other than Hirsch and his co-
authors, have devoted sustained attention to studying habitability and
rent-withholding laws empirically. The available evidence therefore
suggests that Posner was right to be skeptical that the Chicago ordi-
nance would help poor tenants but perhaps too hasty to conclude that
it would harm them.
Why might such legal reforms have minimal effects on the rental
housing market? One possibility is that the poor tenants who are
likely to be evicted are ignorant of their legal rights, and thus usually
do not assert newly authorized causes of action in the courts.2 This
explanation is supported by evidence from several jurisdictions, in-
cluding Chicago. Six months after the Chicago ordinance at issue in
this case became law, tenants were largely still oblivious to their newly
acquired rights, despite a substantial publicity effort by the city."
19 See Chicago Board of Realtors, 819 F2d at 742 (Posner concurring).
20 See Hirsch, 63 Rev Econ & Stat at 269 (cited in note 18) ("Receivership laws permit the
court to appoint a receiver who takes control of buildings and corrects hazardous defects after
the landlord has failed to act within a reasonable time. Rent is deposited with the court-
appointed receiver until the violation is corrected, and as long as the tenant continues to pay rent
into escrow he cannot be evicted for non-payment.").
21 See generally Werner Z. Hirsch, Effects of Habitability and Anti-Speedy Eviction Laws
on Black and Aged Indigent Tenant Groups: An Economic Analysis, 3 Intl Rev L & Econ 121
(1983). Assuming its robustness, this finding suggests that the effects of the Chicago ordinance
would be worse than Posner anticipated in an important sense. Landlords might have relied
increasingly on tenant screening after the enactment of the Chicago ordinance, perhaps letting
racial animus infect their renting decisions or using criteria that had a disparate impact on Afri-
can-American renters.
22 See Ben H. Logan III and John J. Sabl, The Great Green Hope: The Implied Warranty of
Habitability in Practice, 28 Stan L Rev 729, 776-77 (1976) (concluding in part that the implied
warranty of habitability is "unknown and relatively unimportant to the very people it was in-
tended to assist"). Relatedly, landlords and tenants might fall back on efficient social norms,
regardless of what the law says. See Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors
Settle Disputes 279 (Harvard 1991) (arguing that the norm of "you are entitled to get what you
pay for" governs landlord-tenant relations more than any legal regime).
23 For a review of this literature, see Roger A. Cunningham, The New Implied and Statu-
tory Warranties of Habitability in Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 Urban L Ann 3,
144-53 (1979).
24 Michele L. Norris, Renters Still in the Dark about Rights, Chi Trib Section 2 at 1 (Apr 27,
1987).
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II. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LANDLORD-TENANT REGULATION
It is heartening to see a federal judge grappling with the econom-
ics of landlord-tenant regulation in a sophisticated way. Indeed, if the
debate between Posner and Cudahy in Chicago Board of Realtors is
about whether the real economic consequences of the ordinance shed
light on its constitutionality, the reader should not hesitate to side with
Posner. That said, whereas Posner's economic critique of the Chicago
ordinance is plausible, his political economy story fares worse.
Posner foreshadows his political economy story early in the opin-
ion, asserting that the "stated purpose of the ordinance is to promote
public health, safety, and welfare and the quality of housing in Chi-
cago. It is unlikely that this is the real purpose, and it is not the likely
effect." Posner's economic analysis of the ordinance immediately
follows, but he returns to explaining the ordinance's "real purpose"
three paragraphs later:
The ordinance is not in the interest of poor people. As is fre-
quently the case with legislation ostensibly designed to promote
the welfare of the poor, the principal beneficiaries will be middle-
class people. They will be people who buy rather than rent hous-
ing (the conversion of rental to owner housing will reduce the
price of the latter by increasing its supply); people willing to pay
a higher rent for better-quality housing; and (a largely overlap-
ping group) more affluent tenants, who will become more attrac-
tive to landlords because such tenants are less likely to be later
with the rent or to abuse the right of withholding rent .... The
losers from the ordinance will be some landlords, some out-of-
state banks, the poorest class of tenants, and future tenants. The
landlords are few in number .... Out-of-staters can't vote in Chi-
cago elections. Poor people in our society don't vote as often as
the affluent.And future tenants are a diffuse and largely un-
known class. In contrast, the beneficiaries of the ordinance are
the most influential group in the city's population. So the politics
of the ordinance are plain enough, and they have nothing to do
with either improving the allocation of resources to housing or
bringing about a more equal distribution of income and wealth."6
The block quote is lengthy, and the reader will be tempted to skip over
it, often a winning strategy when it comes to block quotes. But this is a
rare instance in which the reader ought to resist that temptation, be-
25 Chicago Board of Realtors, 819 F2d at 741 (Posner concurring).
26 Id at 742 (citation omitted).
2007] 1877
The University of Chicago Law Review
cause in the span of a couple hundred words, Posner has constructed a
fascinating, intricate, novel, and wrongheaded account of urban politics.
Let us begin with Posner's assessment of the role of interest
groups in the ordinance's enactment. Posner helpfully divides the af-
fected parties into winners (homeowners, renters of luxury apart-
ments, and high-income renters)' and losers (landlords, out-of-state
banks, poor renters, and future renters). This political fight turns out to
be no contest, according to Posner. Homeowners are "the most influ-
ential group in the city's population" and the losers are political pip-
squeaks who can't vote (out-of-state banks), don't vote (poor renters),
or don't have enough votes (landlords). 9
Posner's characterization of the ordinance's winners and losers is,
at the very least, controversial. Take homeowners." Posner predicts
that the Chicago ordinance will lower real estate values, especially for
condominiums, but fails to explain why homeowners would want
home prices to drop. Home equity is the nest egg of many Americans,
to be used for retirement or as collateral for education, businesses,
startups, and other important investments.3' A decline in real estate
prices is hardly a cause for celebration among existing homeowners,
just as a decline in stock prices rarely perks up the moods of equity
investors. Much of the pertinent economics literature is premised on
the idea that homeowners want to maximize the value of their homes,
and that this motivation best explains local governments' land use
policies." To be sure, some people benefit from declines in real estate
prices. Among them, two groups stand out: renters who can afford to
buy homes and homeowners in other locales who are thinking about
moving to Chicago. The former are not a particularly large or power-
ful interest group. The latter are "a diffuse and largely unknown
class"'3 of nonvoters with no clout in Chicago politics.
What about the banks? Posner is surely right that instate banks
would gain some business under the ordinance, in light of the new re-
27 Presumably, in the mid-1980s, the moniker "luxury apartments" meant something more
than "running water provided." Today, practically every landlord in Chicago claims to be renting
"luxury apartments"
28 By implication, instate banks should be counted as winners, though Posner omits them
from his tally.
29 Chicago Board of Realtors, 819 F2d at 742.
30 Homeowners are numerous and relatively affluent. But their political potency might be
mitigated somewhat by their dispersed nature. Nevertheless, Posner's description of their political
clout seems apt. See William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence
Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies 4 (Harvard 2001) ("[Hlome-
owners.., are the most numerous and politically influential group within most localities.").
31 Id.
32 See, for example, id.
33 Chicago Board of Realtors, 819 F2d at 742.
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quirement that landlords deposit tenants' security deposits in the ju-
risdiction. But servicing interest-bearing accounts is small potatoes in
the banking industry. The mortgage lending business is banks' bread
and butter, and the market for mortgage loans has long been national
in scope. Condominium conversions should engender substantial
mortgage lending activity, as renters approach banks seeking loans. So
if Posner's economic analysis is right, then out-of-state banks will lose
a handful of interest bearing accounts, but will gain substantially from
increased mortgage lending activities. That looks like a win, not a loss,
for the banks, and it might explain their lack of involvement in this
litigation.
One politically powerful interest group is mysteriously omitted
from the political economy account: real estate agents. This oversight
is odd, given the case caption in Chicago Board of Realtors. We can
certainly imagine that realtors would be upset by declining real estate
prices, since agents have long received a 6 percent commission on the
purchase price of residential real estate. On the other hand, if Posner's
predictions about rental buildings going condo are correct, these de-
clines in real estate prices could be offset by an increase in the number
of sales. But in order to keep their earnings at the same level, real es-
tate agents would have to work harder. Selling ten homes requires
more work than selling nine homes, but selling a $1,000,000 home is
probably no more difficult than selling a $900,000 home. So the real
estate agents' involvement in this litigation may have a straightfor-
ward explanation.
Tallying the winners and losers from this ordinance, then, turns out
to be more difficult than Posner's opinion suggests. But Posner goes
further astray in converting his account of the winners and losers into
an explanation of why the Chicago ordinance was enacted. Posner sees
middle class homeowners as the primary beneficiaries of the legislation
and thinks this is no accident. He describes aiding this politically power-
ful interest group as the ordinance's "real purpose."'' Hence, Posner
says, "the politics of the ordinance are plain enough," and he follows
this statement with a "compare" citation to Stephen DeCanio's essay,
Rent Control Voting Patterns, Popular Views, and Group Interests."
Alas, DeCanio's essay undercuts Posner's claims. DeCanio stud-
ied Santa Barbara voters' support for a local rent control ordinance
and statewide rent control initiative.3 DeCanio found that renter
34 See id at 741.
35 Id at 742.
36 Stephen J. DeCanio, Rent Control Voting Patterns, Popular Views, and Group Interests, in
M. Bruce Johnson, ed, Resolving the Housing Crisis: Government Policy, Decontrol and the Pub-
lic Interest 301,307-10 (Ballinger 1982).
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status made voters significantly more likely to support the local rent
control ordinance and that party affiliation also had a significant ef-
fect.37 After controlling for renter status and partisan affiliation, pov-
erty status and minority ethnic group membership did not significantly
affect support for rent control.3 Although DeCanio plausibly posited
that rent control could harm poor people and minorities (by prompt-
ing greater discrimination by landlords, who would regard the poor
and minorities as less upwardly mobile, and hence long-term tenants),
he suggested that voters in general would "see no farther than imme-
diate redistributive effects" and hence be unaware of this potential
dynamic.39 On the next page, DeCanio elaborates:
Despite the lure of redistributionism, the economists' arguments
against rent control on allocational grounds are not easily dis-
missed intellectually.... [O]nce a measure has been certified for
the ballot, there is no a priori reason to expect that citizens will
acquire and apply the information necessary to make a fully in-
formed evaluation of the arguments. The costs of acquiring the
information can be very large indeed. Although rent control is
relatively simple in its economic analytics compared to some of
the other economic issues facing the public, the analysis is not
self-evident. The incontrovertible evidence of economic rational-
ity exhibited at the level of individual economic activity does not
imply that individuals will be able to generate, recognize, or sup-
port globally optimal economic policies."
Rent control, DeCanio concludes, presents a fairly easy economic
question, but voters have a difficult time understanding how the sec-
ond-order distortions that rent control creates may adversely affect
them. Accordingly, boundedly rational voters may well vote against
their long-term economic interests. If the economics of rent control
are too complicated for the median voter to understand, then the
same voter would have been at sea in trying to make sense of the eco-
nomics of the Chicago ordinance's rent-withholding, warranty of habi-
tability, and other provisions.
Of course, where complex issues arise, the median voter is not
necessarily left to her own devices. Political and mass media elites
might set to work understanding an ordinance and then explain the
ordinance's effects in language that ordinary voters can understand.
To that end, it is worth reviewing the contemporary media coverage of
37 Id at 312.
38 Id.
39 Id at 313.
40 Idat314.
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the Chicago ordinance to see if the welfare and distributional effects
that Posner posits were discussed in the press.
The Chicago ordinance was the subject of extensive coverage
from the local newspapers, but none of that coverage suggested that
middle class owners of single-family residences played any part in se-
curing its enactment. Rather, the newspapers uniformly identified ten-
ants' rights groups as the interests agitating for the legislation." In-
deed, according to the Chicago Tribune, it seemed plain that tenants
would be the primary beneficiaries of the legislation and landlords
would suffer its consequences." Although the news coverage occa-
sionally made passing reference to the possibility that landlords would
respond to the ordinance by raising rents or scrutinizing incoming
tenants more closely,"3 these claims were often juxtaposed with anec-
dotal evidence suggesting that this had not happened in the nearby
suburb of Evanston, which had previously enacted similar legislation."
In short, Judge Posner's account of Chicago's political economy
seems unsupported by contemporary media coverage. It is not difficult
to imagine Posner's political economy story resonating in the dining
room of The University of Chicago's Quadrangle Club, but it is hard
to believe that voters in the city's other precincts could have fathomed
the Posnerian spin on the legislation. For Posner's political thesis to
have been right, there must have been a conspiracy of silence among
single family homeowners, all of whom tacitly agreed to support the
ordinance as an effective means of lowering [!] real estate values,
while pushing forward tenant dupes to lend a proletarian veneer to
the legislative effort. Nudge nudge, wink wink. Say no more.
In Chicago Board of Realtors, Judge Posner appears to have
made the mistake of projecting his own dim view of the ordinance
onto the minds of the median Chicago voter or alderman. Almost
twenty years later, Posner sometimes continues to think about eco-
nomic regulation through the same lens. For example, one of his 2006
41 See, for example, Harry Golden, Jr., Renters Get a Rights Law, Chi Sun-Times 1 (Sept 9,
1986); Mark Hart, Cheering Crowd Greets Mayor, Tenants Rights, Uptown News Al (Aug 5,1986);
Juanita Bratcher, Activists Praise Tenants Rights Ordinance, Chi Defender 4 (Apr 23, 1984).
42 See Ann Marie Lipinski, Tenants Get to Wield New Tool: Repair and Deduct, Chi Trib
Section 2 at 1 (Oct 12,1986).
43 See, for example, Bill Granger, For Chicago Renters: A Taxing Situation That Hits You
Where You Live, Chi Trib Sunday Magazine 8 (Nov 2, 1986) (referring to real estate agents and
landlords who said that the ordinance would result in higher security deposits); Lipinski, Tenants
Get to Wield New Tool, Chi Trib Section 2 at 1 (cited in note 42) (quoting a real estate manage-
ment company president's fear that rents would go up in response to the ordinance).
44 See David D. Orr, Letter to the Editor, Tenants, Rents, Chi Trib Section 1 at 10 (Nov 26,
1986) (arguing that a similar ordinance in Evanston had not had the dire consequences predicted
in Granger's article); Lipinski, Tenants Get to Wield New Tool, Chi Trib Section 2 at 1 (cited in
note 42).
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posts on the Becker-Posner blog argues that (1) middle class teenagers
and very poor workers are harmed by minimum wage increases (a
plausible claim); (2) these teenagers and very poor workers under-
stand the ways they are harmed by said increases (an implausible
claim); and (3) minimum wage increases are enacted because the very
poor and teenagers do not vote in large numbers (implausible, given
the implausibility of claim (2))." The political science literature has
long noted that teenagers and the very poor typically lack an under-
standing of the economist's critique of minimum wage laws, and there-
fore they may not vote in accordance with their purported long-term
economic interests.6 Public opinion polls and newspaper stories indi-
cate that teens and the poorest voters are typically enthusiastic about
minimum wage increases-they believe such mandates will increase
their pay but do not contemplate the possibility that their jobs will be
eliminated." So while interest group theories might explain the en-
actment of minimum wage increases, ' it is not the case that the inter-
45 See Richard A. Posner, Should Congress Raise the Federal Minimum Wage?, The Becker-
Posner Blog (Nov 26,2006), online at http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2006/11/should-
congress.html (visited Sept 29, 2007):
So why are Democrats pushing to increase the minimum wage ... ? [G]enuinely poor peo-
ple vote little. The number of nonpoor who would be benefited by an increase in the mini-
mum wage, when combined with the number of nonpoor workers whose incomes will rise
as a result of reducing competition from minimum-wage workers, probably exceeds the
number of nonpoor who will be laid off as a result of an increase in the minimum wage.
Teenagers, moreover, will be among the groups hardest hit, and most of them do not vote.
46 See, for example, William R. Keech, More on the Vote Winning and Vote Losing Qualities
of Minimum Wage Laws, 29 Pub Choice 133, 134-36 (1977). Interestingly, however, even though
teenagers often do not appreciate their economic interests, their legislators seem to. Legislators
from districts with higher numbers of teenage workers are more likely to oppose legislation
increasing the minimum wage. See generally Jonathan I. Silberman and Garey C. Durden, De-
termining Legislative Preferences on the Minimum Wage: An Economic Approach, 84 J Pol Econ
317 (1976) (presenting an economic analysis of legislative voting patterns on the 1973 amend-
ment to the Fair Labor Standards Act).
47 See, for example, Jennifer Freeze, Teens and the Election: Minimum Wage Most Impor-
tant Issue to Many Local Youths, Southeast Missourian 12A (Oct 31, 2006), online at
http://www.semissourian.com/story/print/1175362.html (visited Sept 29, 2007); Bill Bush, Young
Voters Favor Issue 2, Student Survey Says, Columbus Dispatch 3C (Oct 19, 2006); Exit Polls for
Missouri Proposition B, online at http:/lwww.cnn.coffiELECTION2006/pages/resultslstates
MO/I/02/epolls.0.html (visited Sept 29, 2007) (showing that in the 2006 election, the poorest
voters favored an increase in minimum wage by the highest margins); Exit Polls for Ohio Issue 2,
online at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION2006/pages/resultsstates/OH103/epolls.0.html (vis-
ited Sept 29, 2007) (showing that in the 2006 election, the poorest voters and the youngest voters
backed a minimum wage increase by the highest margins).
48 See Russell S. Sobel, Theory and Evidence on the Political Economy of the Minimum
Wage, 107 J Pol Econ 761,779-82 (1999) (focusing on organized labor unions and business inter-
ests, and concluding that the minimum wage level can "be explained by the relative strength of
interest groups"); Frank G. Steindl, The Appeal of Minimum Wage Laws and the Invisible Hand
in Government, 14 Pub Choice 133,133-34 (1973) (providing an economic analysis of why those
who stand to lose from the minimum wage support it).
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est groups representing teens and the very poor lose these political
fights. If anything, they appear to be on what Posner would say is the
wrong, but winning, side of those fights.'9
III. AFTERMATH
Less able and more modest judges would have refrained from
telling any sort of political economy story in a case like Chicago Board
of Realtors, let alone one as intricate as Posner's. Judge Cudahy's bor-
ing opinion disposed of all the legal issues necessary for the courts to
resolve the case. Constitutional objections to similar rent withholding
ordinances were raised in a good number of state courts prior to Chi-
cago Board of Realtors, and none of them seem to have succeeded.'
The separate opinion in the case is a gambit that non-Posnerian judges
would not, and should not, try at home. But should a Posnerian judge
try it? Or, more aptly, should the Posnerian judge?
Judge Posner seemed to have strong views about the foolishness
of landlord-tenant reforms along the lines of Chicago's efforts, so we
can assume that he enjoyed airing those views and attempting to in-
fluence the public debate over them. In that sense, Chicago Board of
Realtors was a great success. Posner's opinion (unlike Cudahy's) found
its way into the dominant Property casebook used in American law
schools,' where it is the primary case on affordable housing law," and
its substance has not been heavily criticized. 3 The discussion of rent-
withholding statutes and housing code enforcement in Posner's trea-
tise on the economic of analysis of law similarly cites to only one case:
Chicago Board of Realtors."
At the same time, there was a cost to voicing his displeasure with
the ordinance. Future jurists confronting similar challenges saw Pos-
ner's denunciation of the ordinance, but also his bottom line, and con-
cluded that if Posner could not strike down the ordinance in light of
his deep skepticism as to its wisdom, neither could they." Whatever its
impact on 1L Property students, its impact on contemporary jurists
49 On the broader phenomenon, see generally Tyler Cowen, Self-Deception as the Root of
Political Failure, 124 Pub Choice 437 (2005) (advancing a theory that political failure results
because "[i]ndividuals discard free information when that information damages their self-image
and thus lowers their utility").
50 See 40 ALR 3d 821 at § 2 (cited in note 10).
51 See Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 Nw U L Rev 907, 908 n 6 (2004)
(noting the ubiquity of the property casebook by Jesse Dukeminier and his coauthors).
52 Jesse Dukeminier, et al, Property 444 (Aspen 6th ed 2006).
53 See id at 552-55.
54 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 16.6 at 518 n 9 (Aspen 5th ed 1998).
55 See, for example, Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank v Village of Mount Prospect, 181 Ill
App 3d 10, 536 NE2d 763,771 (1989).
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seems to have been negligible. The one important published case that
embraced parts of Posner's analysis, Action Apartment Association v
Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 6 employed Posner's characteriza-
tion of the Chicago ordinance as a naked wealth transfer to hold that
a law requiring landlords to pay tenants 3 percent interest on security
deposits kept for longer than a year was an unconstitutional taking."
Action Apartment, however, applied the Supreme Court's Penn Cen-
tral takings test unpersuasively." Hence subsequent California courts
essentially have limited Action Apartment to its facts. 9
This is a tradeoff that Posner undoubtedly understood. His criti-
cisms of the wisdom of enacting ordinances like Chicago's could reso-
nate with legal scholars and the generations of law students that they
would teach. In the long term, Posner's opinion could help lay the
groundwork for the eventual repeal or invalidation of such laws. But
in the short run, Posner's unwillingness to strike down the ordinance
in light of his many qualms seemed to put the final nail in the coffin of
a rather broad but universally unsuccessful effort to invalidate these
sorts of ordinances on constitutional grounds. As Posner wistfully re-
marks toward the end of his opinion, the "plaintiffs have brought their
case in the wrong era."'' Seen in this light, we might treat Chicago
Board of Realtors as a data point that provides hints about Posner's
discount rate. His willingness to tolerate a short-term and medium-
term policy that he found deeply misguided, in the hopes that his
words might help engender a long-term reversal driven by legal elites,
suggests that Posner cares a great deal about the way in which he will
be remembered once he puts down his pen.
56 94 Cal App 4th 587,114 Cal Rptr 2d 412 (2001).
57 Id at 426 (citing Chicago Board of Realtors to support Takings Clause analysis). Recall
that Judge Posner had chastised the plaintiffs for not pressing a takings argument on appeal. See
note 14.
58 Under Penn Central, the extent of the diminution in the landlord's property interest is
the most important factor in determining whether a taking has occurred. Regulations that reduce
the value of the regulated land by 50 percent or more are often deemed not to be takings under
Penn Central. See Tahoe-Sierra Preserv Council v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 US 302,
319 n 15 (2002) (noting that diminution of property value cannot alone establish a taking). The
idea that a deprivation of the difference between the market interest rate and 3 percent is a
taking under Penn Central strains credulity, for such a regulation would have a minimal effect on
the value of the landlord's real property. See id at 327 (noting that a significant deprivation of
property is required to make a taking). See also Yee v City of Escondido, 503 US 519,539 (1992)
(holding that a rent control ordinance is not a taking).
59 See, for example, Small Property Owners of San Francisco v City and County of San
Francisco, 141 Cal App 4th 1388, 47 Cal Rptr 3d 121, 133-36 (2006) (distinguishing Action
Apartment on numerous grounds to hold that a San Francisco ordinance requiring a 5 percent
interest on tenants' security deposits did not effect a taking).
60 Chicago Board of Realtors, 819 F2d at 745 (Posner concurring).
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